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This research study focuses on the test for review as set down in the  Sidumo & another v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd &others  (2007) BLLR 1097 (CC) (herein after referred to as 
Sidumo),  judgement. An analysis of case law is undertaken in order to determine whether the 
test is now in decline. This is achieved by exploring the relevant case law and cases that were 
decided before the Sidumo case, particularly the  Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus and others 
(1998) 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) (herein after referred to as Carephone)case. The Sidumo (CC) 
case is discussed in detail, as well as the recent judgements in Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 
(701/2012)2013ZASCA (herein after referred to as Herholdt) and  Goldfields Mining South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd  (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA (JA 2/2012) 2013 ZALAC 28, 2014 1 BLLR 
(herein after referred to as Gold Fields Mining) 
The aim of this work is to explore whether employment justice for all might be better served 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
It is not inconceivable that disputes will arise in an employer-employee relationship. The law 
prescribes formalities which have to be followed in order to resolve such issues in the 
interests of fairness. This is important because the employer-employee relationship is not an 
equal one. The employer has more power, especially in financial terms. Therefore, in seeking 
to prevent an employer from abusing his/her power, labour laws prescribe measures to 
resolve disputes in a fair manner. 
1.2 Background 
In order to ensure that labour-related disputes are resolved in a speedy and cost-effective 
manner, the legislature enacted the Labour Relations Act1 (LRA) and established the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). Many employees do not 
have the financial means to approach the Labour Court (LC) in order to challenge their 
employer’s decisions.2 The CCMA enables an employee to resolve disputes with their 
employer without incurring onerous costs.3   
One of the primary objectives of the LRA is to effectively resolve labour disputes.4 The 
process of dispute resolution includes the identification of a commissioner to arbitrate 
between an employer and employee.5 The commissioner is tasked with speedily and fairly 
resolving the dispute.6 In terms of section 143 (1), an arbitration award is final and binding 
and must be enforced as though it were an order of the LC.  
1.3 Main research question 
The main research question that this study addresses is whether or not employment justice 
would be better served if arbitration awards were subjected to the process of appeal rather 
than review. In answering this question, the following sub-questions are posed: 
 
                                               
1 66 of 1995. 
2 P Benjamin ‘Friend or foe? The impact of judicial decisions on the operation of the CCMA’ (2007) 28 ILJ 1at 3-6; The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act 1995 16 ILJ 278 (‘The Explanatory 
Memorandum’) at 279 & 318-319; also see Paul Benjamin & Carole Cooper ‘Innovation and continuity: 
Responding to the Labour Relations Bill’ (1995) 16 ILJ 258. 
3Ibid 
4 Section 1 of the LRA. 






What do the processes of appeal and review entail? 
What are the differences between these processes? 
What was the position with regard to appeal and review before the Sidumo & another v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd &others (2007) BLLR 1097 case? 
What are the repercussions of the test applied in the Sidumo case?  
1.4 Methodology 
This research study comprises desktop research that draws on statutes, journal articles and 
case law.  The cases considered are critically analysed to assess whether the legal principles 
are accurately applied and interpreted. 
1.4.1 Structure 
The dissertation is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 1introduction and background 
 Chapter 2 examines the processes of appeal and review. It analyses the differences 
between these processes and highlight the grounds for each. It concludes by assessing 
how these processes fit into arbitration awards handed down by the CCMA. 
 Chapter 3 considers the position before the Sidumo case.  
 Chapter 4 analyses the Sidumo case and highlights its findings. It also considers the 
test for reviewing arbitration awards and the repercussions of this test. 
 Chapter 5 examines the cases that followed the Sidumo case and highlights what was 
held in those cases in light of appeal and review processes.  









CHAPTER 2:   PROCESSES OF APPLEAL AND REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
Before analysing case law, it is important to distinguish between appeal and review. This is 
due to the fact that has been argued that appeals are the best route to follow for justice to be 
done in labour law.7   
2.2 Appeal and Review 
In the legal context, review entails the correctness of procedure which is followed in reaching 
a decision,8 while appeal refers to the procedure which is followed in assessing the 
correctness of the decision itself.9 Hoexter (2012) notes that appeal and review are methods 
to re-examine a decision.10 She adds that even though the motive for making a finding on 
either of the two processes (appeal or review) will normally result in an identical outcome, 
these processes of appeal and review serve different functions.11  
In theory, it is generally observed that the distinction between the concepts of appeal and 
review is quite clear.12 The main difference is that when conducting an appeal, the appellate 
court has the mandate to consider the merits of the matter before it and conclude if the 
decision of the court of first instance was right or wrong.13 On the other hand, in a review the 
court may not consider the merits of the decision but rather the manner in which such a 
decision was reached. In this instance the courts are tasked with the mandate to determine 
whether or not the procedures followed in the court a quo were appropriate.14    
The case of Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council15 
provided the classic definition of the term ‘review’.16 In the majority judgement, Innes CJ 
held that there were three distinct forms of review, namely review of decisions of lower 
courts and the decisions of administrative authorities commonly referred to as common-law 
                                               
7 J Murphy, ‘An Appeal for an Appeal’, (2013) 34 ILJ 
8 http://www.difference between.com/difference accessed on 16 August 2013. 
9  Ibid 
10 C Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa 2012, p108. 
11 Ibid  p108 
12 E Fergus. 2013 ‘Distinction Between Appeals and Reviews - Defining the Limits of the Labour Courts : Powers of 
Review’ in the International Labour Law Journal Vol. 31 at 1556.  
13 Ibid  p1556  
14 Ibid p1556 
15 Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 TS 111 at 116 





review and statutory review.17 These two forms of review continue to play a role in post-
apartheid South Africa.18  
Hoexter submits that reviews now take one of five forms.19The first is the review of an 
inferior court decision.20 This is similar to the type of review pronounced in the 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co case. 21  
The second form of review is an automatic review. This type of review obliges a superior 
court to automatically review the decision of a stipulated judicial officer.22 The process is 
accordingly initiated by a superior court rather than by an aggrieved party to the inferior 
court’s decision.23  
The third form is judicial review in the constitutional sense.24 This is concerned with the 
direct application of the Constitution by a reviewing court.25  A decision that is in violation of 
the Constitution is declared unconstitutional.26  
The fourth form of review is a judicial review in the administrative law sense. This emanates 
from section 33 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (PAJA) and is no longer simply governed by common law.27   
The final form of review is special statutory review.28 This refers to the courts’ entitlement to 
review the decisions of inferior courts or tribunals especially where they are expressly 
empowered to do so by legislation.29 The powers granted to the reviewing court may extend 
beyond the powers ordinarily conferred on appellate courts.30 It is important to note that 
while section 145 of the LRA falls squarely into this category, the power of the courts to 
undertake review proceedings on the basis of statutory direction remains subject to the 
                                               
17   C Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa  2012,p112 
18  Ibid  p112 
19 C Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa  2012,p112-113 
20 Ibid  p112 
21 Ibid   p113  
22 Ibid   p113 
23 Ibid  p113 
24 Ibid  p113 
25 Ibid  p113 
26 Ibid   p113 
27 Ibid p113 
28 E Fergus, Difference between Appeals and Reviews –Defining the limits of the Labour Court’s Powers of  Reviews 
(2010)31 ILJ 1558 
29 Ibid  p1558 





requirements of the Constitution.31This means that the review must be in line with the 
Constitution. 
2.3 Forms of Appeal 
In Chevron Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Nkambule & Others32 the court highlighted the various 
forms of appeal. In Tikly and Others v Johannes NO and Others33 the court discussed the 
different meanings which may be attributed to the concept of appeal. These include: 
An appeal in the broad sense, that is, a total re-hearing of and new determination on the 
merits of the case with or without more evidence or information; 
An appeal in the general strict sense, that is, a rehearing on the merits but limited to the 
evidence or information on which the decision that is under appeal was made. The only 
determination is whether that decision was right or wrong.34 
In Chevron Engineering (Pty) Ltd35 it was held that whilst the proceedings before the court 
properly involved a rehearing on the merits, in conducting the rehearing, the court is limited 
to the evidence which had been presented before the court a quo.36  The judge therefore 
pointed out that the only question under consideration was if the decision of the court of first 
instance had been correct or wrong; this was done without leading any new evidence but was 
based on the evidence already presented in the court a quo.37 
The differences between appeal and review 
Hoexter is of the view that it is more prudent to use an appeal process when it is suspected 
that the decision-maker arrived at an incorrect decision on the facts of the law.38  She adds 
that an appeal deals with the merits of the case; therefore, in the appeal process, the court is 
obliged decide whether the decision of the court a quo was right or wrong.39 
                                               
31  Ibid p1558 
32 Chevron Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Nkambule & Others (2001)22 ILJ 627 (LAC). 
33 Tikly and Others v Johannes NO and Others 1963  (2) SA 588 (T)  
34 Chevron Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Nkambule & Others (2001)22 ILJ 627 (LAC) para 15. 
35 Ibid   para15 
36  Ibid  para15 
37  Ibid  para15 
38 C Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa 2012, p108. 





On the other hand, a review does not examine the merits of the decision but whether it was 
arrived at in an appropriate manner.40 It therefore considers the procedure that was followed 
to reach the decision.41   
Hoexter postulates that the issue concerning review is not whether the record reveals relevant 
considerations that are capable of justifying the outcome.42 This is the territory of appeal 
where the question is whether the decision was correct.43 Govender states that another major 
distinction is that review is an external safeguard against maladministration, whereas appeals 
constitute an internal or domestic check. 44 This means that effective administrative appeal 
tribunals breed confidence in the administration as they give assurance to all aggrieved 
persons that the decision has been considered at least more than once and reaffirmed. In 
addition they include a second decision-maker who is able to exercise a calmer, more 
objective and reflective assessment in reconsidering the issue.45 
Fergus identifies the major characteristics of an appeal and a review.46 She notes that appeals 
involve a rehearing of the merits of the decision and the appellate court can only look at the 
evidence and material that was before the court or tribunal of first instance.  
As far as the granting of remedies is concerned, those that can be granted by a reviewing 
court are not the same as those which may be granted by an appellate court. An appeal court 
may substitute the decision of the court a quo or tribunal with its own decision after hearing 
the matter afresh. On the other hand, when it comes to review, the court may not overturn the 
decision; it can only set it aside, but it may send the matter back to the court or tribunal of 
first instance to be heard again. It should be noted that the Labour Court (herein after referred 
to as L.C) does sometimes substitute its own decision.  
The Labour relations Act 47 stipulates the following procedure as far as allegations of defects 
are concerned. 
 
                                               
40 Ibid  p109 
41 Ibid   p109 
42 Ibid  p109 
43 K  Govender  Administrative Appeals Tribunals in Bennet et al 77, quoting Lawrence Baxter Administrative Law. (1984) p 
255 
44 Ibid p 255 
45Ibid  p255 
46 E Fergus. 2013 ‘Distinction Between Appeals and Reviews-Defining the Limits of the Labour Courts : Powers of Review’ 
in the International Labour Law Journal Vol. 31 at 1556.  





In terms section 145 of the Labour Relations Act:48 
(1) ‘Any party to a dispute who alleges a defect in any arbitration proceedings under the 
auspices of the Commission may apply to the Labour Court for an order setting aside the 
arbitration award: 
 (a)   within six weeks of the date that the award was served on the applicant, unless the 
alleged defect involves the commission of an offence referred to in Part 1 to 4, or section 17, 
20 or 21 (in so far as it relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2 of the Prevention 
and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004;’ appeal has been finalized, the institution of 
review proceedings does not necessarily have the same effect. 
Section 145 of the LRA therefore makes provision for an aggrieved party to a dispute to have 
a CCMA award or decision set aside by the LC.49 This point was clearly highlighted in 
NUMSA & Another v Espach Engineering50. It was also held in this case that launching a 
review application does not interrupt the running of the prescription of a claim due according 
to the terms of an arbitration award.51 
The decision of the court was that the employer's inaction had no bearing on the running of 
the prescription period because the union could have enforced the award at any time.52 
However, it is important to note that the court added that its finding may have been different 
had it been furnished with a copy of the record of the review proceedings.53 
In the context of labour disputes, two provisions provide for review proceedings.54 Section 
145 of the LRA deals with the review of arbitration awards and section 158 makes provision 
for the review of any act or function performed according to the LRA.55 The courts have 
maintained the distinction between proceedings in accordance with these sections when 
undertaking review proceedings.56  Please note that s145 will be explained in detail in chapter 
4.The next chapter analyses the position on review before the Sidumo57 case was decided. 
 
                                               
48  Act 66 of 1995 
49Ibid 
50 (2010) 31 ILJ 987 (LC) 
51 Ibid  para 11 
52 Ibid  para 18 
53 Ibid  para 17 
54  Act 66 of 1995. 
55 Ibid 
56 Ibid 





CHAPTER 3: THE POSITION BEFORE THE SIDUMO CASE 
3.1 Introduction 
Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others58 set the standard and scope of the test of review 
of CCMA arbitration awards before Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & 
others59 was decided. It was considered the leading case for the test of review in labour law 
by many courts. 
The major difference between the judgment of Sidumo60  and Carephone61  is that Carephone 
was decided under the Interim Constitution and Sidumo was decided after the adoption of 
final Constitution.62 Thus the two cases are closely connected and a rigorous analysis of 
Carephone is important in order to understand Sidumo.63 Carephone has resulted in much 
debate and confusion that has led to challenges in establishing the test for review in labour 
law.64  
3.2 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus No& Others 
In the Carephone case, the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) dealt with the nature and extent of 
the court’s powers of review of CCMA arbitration awards.65  The court had to consider 
whether review proceedings against arbitration awards could be instituted under both sections 
145 and158 (1) (g) of the LRA, or whether the applicants were confined to bringing 
proceedings under section 145.66 
The debate arose because s 145 offered only limited grounds for review and failed to give 
adequate effect to the parties’ rights to just administrative action.67 This obstacle has 
sometimes been circumvented by perceiving s 158(1) (g) as a permissible way to review 
arbitration awards.68 In Carephone, Froneman DJP did not agree with this approach.69 
                                               
58 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus and others [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) 
59 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd &others supra 
60 Ibid 
61 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus and others supra 
62  Section 33 of the Constitution 
 63Ibid 
64 Carephone(Pty) Ltd v Marcus and others supra 
65  Ibid para 2 
66 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
67 Nicci Whitear –Nel ‘Carephone  (Pty)Ltd v Marcus NO & others’ (1998) 19 ILJ 1425 (LAC) (1999) 20 ILJ 1483  at 1484 
68 Ibid  p1484 





In Carephone, the court dealt with the question of whether CCMA arbitrations constituted 
administrative action.70 The court held that while the CCMA was not judicial in nature, it 
remained bound by the Constitutional provisions governing organs of state and public 
administration; it was similarly bound by the Bill of Rights.71 According to Froneman DJP, 
the CCMA was an administrative body for the purposes of the Constitution.72 The Judge 
therefore held that it is clear that, in conducting arbitrations, the CCMA engaged in 
administrative action.73 
Froneman DJP then dealt with the type of review appropriate to administrative action. He 
pointed out that the entrenchment of the right to administrative justice had extended the scope 
of review.74 This was clear from the Constitutional stipulation that administrative action must 
be justifiable in relation to the reasons for it.75 It was submitted that this requirement 
introduced the need for rationality in the merits or outcome of administrative decisions.76 
However, Froneman DJP reiterated that the distinction between appeals and reviews 
remained essential.77  He added that the rationality test did not excuse reviewing courts from 
maintaining this distinction during s 145 proceedings.78  
In Froneman DJP’s view, this fine discrepancy was crucial to sustain the discrete 
characteristics of appeal and review.79 He went on to state that preserving this distinction 
signaled respect for the proper separation of powers between the legislature, the executive 
and the judiciary.80  
Thus Froneman DJP formulated the test for review as follows: 
 ‘…..is there a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the                      
administrative decision maker between the material properly available to him and the 
conclusion he or she eventually arrived at?’81 
                                               
70 Ibid  para 15 
71 Carephone(Pty) Ltd v Marcus and others supra 
72 Ibid para 9 
73 Ibid  para 11-19 
74 Nicci Whitear –Nel ‘Carephone  (Pty)Ltd v Marcus NO & others’ (1998) 19 ILJ 1425 (LAC) (1999) 20 ILJ 1483  at 1484 
75 Ibid p1484 
76 Carephone(Pty) Ltd v Marcus and other supra 
77 Ibid para 30-31 
78 Ibid para 30-31 
79 Ibid  para 30-31 
80 Ibid  para 30-31 





When this new standard was applied to the matter before the court, Froneman DJP found the 
commissioner’s award rationally justifiable.82 The commissioner’s reasoning was rationally 
connected to the material before him and he had therefore not exceeded his ‘constitutionally 
constrained’ powers under s 145(2) (a) (iii).83 
Even though the Carephone decision was criticized by various scholars it is said to be 
commendable in numerous respects.84 This is because it stated that s 145 review proceedings 
were to be conducted in the context of the Constitution.85 It is submitted that Froneman DJP’s 
emphasis on rational justifiability as requiring only the ability to appear justified (rather than 
to be justified) is of great importance in defining the limits of review.86 Furthermore, it is 
submitted that it is clear from Froneman DJP’s decision that the original s 145 grounds for 
review remain applicable.87 
However, it is submitted that notwithstanding the clarity of this decision, subsequent courts 
failed to apply the test consistently88 and that this inconsistency laid a poor foundation for the 
Constitutional Court (CC)’s decision in Sidumo.89 
In Shoprite Checkers (LC)90, Wallis AJ analyzed Carephone, and was of the view that it had 
been wrongly decided.91 Even though it was binding because it was decided by the LAC, he 
was not obliged to follow it.92This is because he examined it and held that it had been 
wrongly decided. Wallis AJ did not agree with Froneman DJP’s findings because, according 
to him, the LAC had construed section 145 inappropriately, and in the absence of a 
constitutional challenge to the section there had been no basis for doing so.93 
The court was faced with the question of whether CCMA arbitrations constituted 
administrative action.94 
                                               
82 Ibid  para 53 
83 Ibid  para 53 
84 Ibid  para 15 -37 
85 Ibid  para 15 - 37 
86 Ibid   para 32 
87 Ibid para 19-37 
88 Edcon v Pillemer NO &others [2010] 1 BLLR 1 (SCA)  para 12. There, Mlambo JA set out the two distinct (but opposing) 
interpretations of the Carephone standard which reviewing courts applied before Sidumo; the judge suggested that only one 
of these interpretations was correct.  
89 Ibid 
90 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others supra 
91 Ibid 
92 Ibid 
93 Ibid  paras 75-77 





However, the court did not answer this question and instead stated the test for review.95 
Zondo JP held that the applicable test for review based on rationality required reviewing 
courts to examine the material available to the commissioner, the final decision taken, and the 
reasons for it.96 The court also stressed the need for efficient resolution of labour disputes.97 
Zondo JP applied the above considerations to the matter and held that the commissioner’s 
award, while open to criticism, was neither irrational nor unjustifiable and was consequently 
not reviewable.98 It is submitted that this judgment is credible because Zondo JP did not 
replace the commissioner’s preferences with his own.99 Furthermore his clarification of the 
nature of review and his emphasis on expediting the resolution of labour disputes supported 
the LRA’s objectives.100 
However, Zondo JP was criticized for not affirming the constitutional status of CCMA 
arbitrations or acknowledging the distinction between justifiability and rationality.101 In 
neglecting the former, the constitutional foundations for review remained unconfirmed.102 It 
is submitted that Zondo JP’s decision did not emphasise the importance of the connections 
made by commissioners between evidence, the award and the reasons in conducting a rational 
review.103 
Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others104 clarified these 
uncertainties.105 Nicholson JA stated that the meaning of the term rational justifiability meant 
that, awards should not be ‘arbitrary and must have been arrived at by a reasoning process as 
opposed to conjecture, fantasy, guesswork, or hallucination.’106 In other words, the arbitrator 
must have applied his/her mind seriously to the issues at hand and reasoned his/her way to the 
conclusion.107 
It is submitted that, Nicholson JA declared that the award was not capable of justification 
even though it was based on the reasons given for it.108 Hence, despite his emphasis on a 
                                               
95 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others supra 
96  Ibid  para 3 
97  Ibid 
98  Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others  supra paras 84 & 101 
99  Ibid 
100 The Explanatory Memorandum at 318-319; section 1(d) of the LRA;   
101 Ibid 
102 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd  v  Ramdaw NO & Others supra. 
103 Ibid 
104 Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Kapp & others supra. 
105 Ibid 
106 Ibid para 58. 
107 Ibid para58 





review of rationality as encompassing an assessment of commissioners’ reasoning process 
and ideally of their decisions, Nicholson JA ultimately concerned himself with the various 
reasons that could sustain the award.109 This enabled intrusive review.110 As a result, the 
distinction between appeal and review was obscured and the Carephone standard was 
misconstrued.111 
However, it is important to note that Carephone contributed immensely to labour law because 
it explained important values attached to review and their constitutional basis. It is important 
to revisit the principles and values addressed by the court in Carephone before analysing 
Sidumo. 
For the purpose of this study, one of the most relevant principles dealt with in Carephone is 
that reviews should not be transmuted into appeals.112 A thorough analysis of the CC’s 













                                               
109 Ibid  para 65 - 67 
110 Ibid   para 65 - 67 
111 Ibid   para 65 - 67 






CHAPTER 4: THE TEST FOR REVIEW IN THE SIDUMO DECISION 
This chapter analyses the Sidumo case and highlights its findings. It also considers the test for 
reviewing arbitration awards and the repercussions of this test. 
The facts of the case are that Sidumo was employed as a security guard by Rustenburg Mines 
and was dismissed when it was discovered that he had repeatedly failed to search employees 
as they left the premises.113 The CCMA commissioner found that the dismissal was 
procedurally fair, but that the sanction of dismissal was inappropriate because the employer 
had suffered no loss, the employee had not acted intentionally and because his conduct did 
not ‘go to the heart of the employment relationship’.114  
On review in the LC, the employer argued that the award was irrational115 as ‘there was no 
link between the evidence and his factual conclusions.116 The commissioner's finding that the 
misconduct did not go to the heart of the employment relationship was also criticized as 
being irrational.117 The mine contended that the commissioner had been so grossly careless 
that he could rightly be described as having had committed misconduct.118 It was submitted 
that the commissioner had failed to apply his mind to such an extent that the mine did not 
have a fair hearing and furthermore, that the commissioner had exceeded his powers.’119 
With reference to the grounds for review set out in s145 of the LRA and the test in 
Carephone, the LC concluded that there was no basis upon which it could interfere with the 
commissioner's award.120 
On appeal, the LAC rejected the reasons on which the commissioner based his award, but 
found that other considerations, in particular the employee’s length of service, had to be taken 
into account by the commissioner in reaching the decision on whether or not dismissal was an 
appropriate sanction.121 The court found that s145122 permitted the review of CCMA 
                                               
113 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) 
114 Ibid  para 21  
115 Ibid  para  22 
116 Ibid para 23 
117 Ibid para 25 
118 Ibid  para 26 
119 Ibid  para 28 
120 Ibid  para 29 
121 Ibid   para 29 





arbitration proceedings that goes beyond mere procedural impropriety to the rational basis of 
the award.123 
The matter was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd v CCMA & Others124. The SCA found that the LAC had not applied 
Carephone correctly.125 Murphy stated that the LAC had not assessed the rational connection 
between the evidence and the reasons given for the conclusion arrived at.126 
In Rustenburg Platinum Mines, the SCA held that employers may set reasonable standards of 
conduct at the workplace and may enforce such standards.127 In a unanimous judgment, it 
ruled that the award be set aside.128 Smit notes that the extent of a commissioner or judge’s 
right to interfere with an employer's judgment regarding the appropriateness of dismissal as a 
penalty for misconduct is a controversial issue.129 
Hoexter submits that the focus is on the way in which the decision-maker came to the 
disputed conclusion.130 Murphy concurs and submits that the focus is on the process and its 
relation to the result.131 The reasons stated by the commissioner did not rationally justify the 
result.132  
However, Smit adds that this does not mean that an employer always knows best when 
deciding on the appropriate sanction for transgression of a workplace rule.133 The SCA took 
account of the fact that the labour courts have stated that even though it is up to the 
commissioner to determine the facts on which the employer relies, on a balance of 
probabilities, the commissioner should not interfere with an employer's decision on the 
appropriateness of dismissal as a penalty unless the decision to dismiss is grossly 
unreasonable134.  
                                               
123  Ibid para 24 
124 Rustenburg Mines Ltd v CCMA & Others [2006]11 BLLR 1021 (SCA) 
125 J Murphy, An appeal for an Appeal,(2013)34 ILJ 6 
126 Ibid p6 
127 Rustenburg Platinum Mines v CCMA supra 
128 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others supra 
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The SCA held that both Carephone and the PAJA required the LAC to consider whether the 
commissioner's decision to reinstate Sidumo was 'rationally connected to the information 
before him and to the reasons he gave for it'. 135 
According to the SCA, the LAC had blurred the line between appeal and review by asking 
whether the considerations taken into account by the commissioner were 'capable of 
sustaining' his finding.136 This was not the question on review; rather, the issue was whether 
the decision-maker properly exercised the powers entrusted to him.137 The SCA held that the 
mine had always considered Sidumo's service record to be relevant.138However, according to 
the mine, despite this, continued employment was intolerable.139 The mine argued that the 
commissioner's decision was tainted by reliance on misconceived considerations.140 Per 
Navsa AJ, the LAC did not apply the 'rational objective test' explained in Carephone, which 
was in line with the PAJA. It incorrectly asked whether there were factors capable of 
sustaining the commissioner's findings, thereby treating the matter as an appeal rather than a 
review.141 
Despite the mine’s subsequent appeals to the LC and the LAC not being successful, the SCA 
overturned both these decisions and the commissioner’s finding was replaced with a ruling 
that the dismissal was fair.142 The matter was taken on appeal to the CC which adopted a 
different approach. 143 
The CC handed down judgment in Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & 
others in 2007.144 In Sidumo, the court held that the grounds for review of CCMA arbitration 
awards set out in s145 of the LRA145 were governed by the constitutional standard of 
reasonableness.146 In terms of this standard, when courts review disputes, they must assess 
the reasonableness of a CCMA commissioner’s award by establishing whether the decision is 
one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.147 
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However, it is submitted that the court did not give reasonable guidance as to how to this 
standard should be applied in practice. This has caused much uncertainty and has resulted in 
different judicial attitudes to review.148 
Sidumo appealed to the CC, giving it an opportunity to analyse the scope of review under 
s145.149 The court had to answer the following questions: Did the reasonable employer test 
remain part of South African law and were CCMA arbitrations treated as administrative 
action?150 The court had to examine the extent to which CCMA arbitrations constitute 
administrative action.151 
In answering the first of these questions the Court rejected the SCA’s findings in Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd.152 In its view, the reasonable employer test did not comply with the 
contemporary constitutional principles of South African labour law.153 
However the CC upheld the SCA’s decision in respect of the second question, holding that 
CCMA arbitration proceedings qualified as administrative action.154 As far as the third 
question was concerned the CC did not agree with the SCA.155  The majority, per Navsa AJ, 
held that CCMA awards were not reviewable under the PAJA.156 
It is submitted that the court reached its conclusion by affirming the constitutional 
foundations for review. The administrative status of the CCMA was the first issue to be 
addressed by the court.157 It recognized the evident similarities between the CCMA and 
courts of law, while recording important distinctions between them.158  
The court confirmed that CCMA arbitrations comprised administrative action.159 Thus the 
court was implying that s145 of the LRA had to be read with s 33(1) of the Constitution – the 
right to just administrative action.160  
The CC in Sidumo held that: 
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‘…section 145 is now suffused by the constitutional standard of reasonableness. That 
standard is the one explained in Bato Star  (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism and others:161 Is the decision reached by the Commissioner one 
that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach?’162 
However, it is submitted that the infusion of s 145 with reasonableness was not the 
straightforward affair it was intended to be. One the one hand, this led to numerous confusing 
decisions by the LC, LAC and SCA.163 Ray-Howet submits that the ‘generous approach 
adopted by the SCA in Sidumo is a much better approach’, as164 by ensuring that an arbitrator 
applies his or her mind to the process, proper and fair decisions are more likely.165 
On the other hand, the CC judgement was welcomed on the grounds that it clarified the law 
in two important respects. ‘Navsa AJ, on behalf of the majority of the court, ruled that s145 
of the LRA in its entirety (and not merely s145(2)(a) (iii)) was suffused by the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness, as defined in Bato Star,166 rather than by the obsolete standard of 
justifiability drawn from the interim Constitution, 1993. The test now is: Is the decision 
reached by the commissioner one that a reasonable decision maker could not reach?’167 
Myburgh submits that the CC replaced the reasonable employer test with what may be called 
the ‘impartial commissioner test.’168 Accordingly, he submits that while the former may have 
been biased in favour of employers, the latter is by no means biased in favour of 
employees169. According to Myburgh, this is consistent with the constitutional right to fair 
labour practices applying equally to both parties; the impartial commissioner test strives to 
ensure absolute neutrality on the part of commissioners in the determination of a sanction.170 
Rycroft’s recent evaluation of the LC points out that 63% of successful reviews before the 
LC in 2011 were based on the fact that the award was found not to be a reasonable 
decision.171 He submits that this shows that the impact of the Sidumo case is that the grounds 
of review set out in s 145(2) of the LRA have to a large extent been eclipsed by the more 
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generalized test of whether the arbitrator’s decision was one that a reasonable decision-maker 
could not reach.172  
The Sidumo test was recently upheld by the SCA’s judgement in Herholdt v Nedbank173, 
where the court confirmed that it is the correct one to apply .It was also stated as the locus 
classicus in the recent decision of Gold Fields v CCMA174 
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CHAPTER 5: POST-SIDUMO CASE ANALYSIS 
This chapter considers the cases that came after the Sidumo case, focusing on appeal and 
review processes.175 It analyses three cases: Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd & others176, Afrox 
Healthcare Ltd v Commision for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others 177 and 
Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd178 Myburgh submits that these cases clarify some of the grounds for 
review encapsulated in s145 of the LRA.179 
The facts of these cases are somewhat similar.180 In each case, the employee was dismissed 
for gross misconduct and reinstated in an arbitration award by a CCMA commissioner.181 
Furthermore, the LAC either set aside or confirmed the setting aside of the award mainly on 
the basis of process-related grounds for review.182 
The question that arises as a result of these three judgements is ‘Is the Sidumo Test in 
decline?’183 In other words the courts no longer putting as much emphasis in the Sidumo test 
when it comes to review. 
5.1 GAGA v Anglo Platinum Ltd & others 184 
In this matter, the employee, a group human resource manager employed by Anglo Platinum 
was dismissed on the grounds of having sexually harassed his personal assistant over a period 
of two years.185 However, he was reinstated in a CCMA award after having been found not 
guilty of misconduct.186 
The employer successfully reviewed the award in the LC,187 but the employee took the matter 
on appeal to the LAC.188 The appeal was dismissed by the LAC (per Murphy AJA).189 The 
court in this case held that in finding the employee not guilty the commissioner had omitted 
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important considerations and failed to apply his mind properly to material evidence and to 
provisions on sexual harassment in the relevant Code of Good Practice.190 
The court held that if a commissioner fails to apply his/her mind properly to material facts 
and consequently narrows the inquiry by incorrectly construing the scope of an applicable 
rule, he/she will not fully and fairly determine the case before him/her.191 In addition, it held 
that such a decision will be tainted by dialectical unreasonableness which results in a lack of 
rational connection between the decision and the evidence and hence a likely unreasonable 
outcome.192 
If a commissioner does not take into account a factor that he/she is bound to take into 
account, his/her decision will be unreasonable.193 As a result of this flaw in the process, it 
will usually be sufficient to set aside the award on the grounds of it being a latent gross 
irregularity, enabling a review in terms of s145 (1) read with s145 (2) (a) (ii) of the LRA.194 
Myburgh submits that, even though the LC has in the past found that there are two forms of 
unreasonableness, these are interlinked and that process failure alone is sufficient basis on 
which to sustain a review; this was the first time that the LAC had done so in clear terms. 195 
Where a commissioner does not apply his mind to material facts and unduly narrows the 
inquiry by incorrectly construing the scope of an applicable rule, he will not fully and fairly 
determine the case before him.196 The resultant decision as a result will be tainted by 
dialectical unreasonableness (process-related unreasonableness), characteristically resulting 
in a lack of rational connection between the decision and the evidence and most likely an 
unreasonable outcome (substantive unreasonableness). 197Usually there will often be an 
overlap between the ground of review based on a failure to take into consideration a relevant 
factor and one based on the unreasonableness of a decision.  Thus  if a commissioner does not 
take into consideration a factor that he is obliged to take into account, his or her decision will 
be unreasonable. (my emphasis).198 
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Ngcobo J’s gross irregularity dictum also formed the basis for the LAC’s judgements in the 
Afrox Healthcare and Herholdt cases.199  The new  principle that failure on the part of a 
commissioner to apply his/her mind to material facts deprives a party of a fair hearing and 
thus constitutes a  gross irregularity, warranting the setting aside of the award, is now firmly 
established in South Africa’s labour law.200 Myburgh notes that in dealing with the 
commissioner’s decision to disallow some evidence at the arbitration, the LAC held that this 
was, in itself, sufficiently irregular to set the award aside as the commissioner did not 
therefore consider all the relevant facts in reaching a decision.201 
5.2 Afrox Healthcare v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others202 
The employee in this case was a night shift supervisor in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) at a 
private hospital operated by Afrox Healthcare.203 He was dismissed for negligence because 
he did not supervise untrained staff and act in a responsible manner, as a result of which a 
patient’s condition deteriorated.204 The patient had undergone an operation and had been in 
the ICU overnight. The patient died after being handed over to the day shift nursing shift 
supervisor.205 
However, the employee’s dismissal was found to be unfair and he was reinstated.206 The 
matter was taken on review and was dismissed by the LC.207 The company took the matter on 
appeal and the LAC (per Mlambo JP) upheld the appeal.208 
The court concluded that the commissioner had not taken proper account of material evidence 
placed before him and had failed to conduct a proper appraisal of critical aspects of the 
matter.209 It is submitted that in addressing the consequences of this failure on the part of the 
commissioner, the LAC differentiated between two types of review. The first is where the 
commissioner does not consider all the material evidence,210 while the second is where the 
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commissioner considers all the material evidence, but it poses a lot of doubt as to how the 
evidence was treated. 211 
The LAC referred to the Sidumo and Carephone cases and held that as far as the review test 
is concerned: 
‘The fact of the matter is that the reasonable decision maker yardstick crafted in 
Sidumo, viewed in the proper context, is none other than that in the absence of a 
rational objective basis (the Carephone test) between the decision arrived at and the 
material placed before the decision maker, the relevant decision is clearly not one 
which a reasonable maker would have arrived at.’212 
Furthermore, the LAC cited the dictum in the CC judgement in the case of New Clicks213 that 
there is clearly an overlap between the grounds for review based on failure to take a relevant 
factor into consideration and that based on the unreasonableness of the decision.214 The court 
went on to hold that a decision-maker must take factors that are essential to a reasonable 
decision into account.215 Hence if a decision-maker fails to take into account a factor that he 
or she is bound to consider, the ensuing decision cannot be said to be that of a reasonable 
decision-maker.216 Thus the LAC held that the award made by the commissioner in this case 
was not one a reasonable decision-maker could have made.217 In other words, it did not pass 
the Sidumo test. 
Myburgh notes that in this case the commissioner’s failure to apply his mind to material 
evidence which had a bearing on the ultimate conclusion made the award irrational and 
unreasonable.218 
5.3 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 219 
The facts of the case are that Herholdt was a successful financial broker who was appointed 
as a beneficiary in his dying client’s will.220   
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He failed to disclose this to his employer, Nedbank, despite a duty to do so in terms of the 
company’s conflict of interest policy.221  Herholdt was dismissed for dishonesty which he 
contested as being unfair at the CCMA.222  In the CCMA arbitration award he was found not 
guilty of the charge and awarded reinstatement.223 Nedbank brought a process-related review, 
alleging that the arbitrator misconstrued evidence, leading to a decision that a reasonable 
decision-maker could not have reached. 224 The LC held that the dismissal was fair and 
granted the review, finding that the commissioner had ignored or discounted relevant 
evidence and failed to apply her mind to a number of material issues and, as a consequence, 
committed gross irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings.225 The award was 
accordingly set aside.226 
Herholdt took the decision of the LC on appeal to the LAC which is the judgment under 
comment. The matter was taken on appeal to the SCA which decision is discussed later in 
this dissertation. 
The first issue that the LAC dealt with on appeal was whether the LC (per Gush J) had 
correctly applied the review test in setting aside the award.227 The LC had found, in effect, 
that the commissioner had committed a series of process-related errors, which served to 
vitiate the award and render the result unreasonable.228 The court relied on the dictum from 
the often-quoted case of Southern Sun Hotel Interests229 per Van Niekerk J. 
‘‘In summary, section 145 requires that the outcome of CCMA arbitration proceedings 
(as represented by the commissioner’s decision) must fall within a band of 
reasonableness, but this does not preclude this Court from scrutinising the process in 
terms of which the decision was made. If a commissioner fails to take material evidence 
into account, or has regard to evidence that is irrelevant, or the commissioner commits 
some other misconduct or a gross irregularity during the proceedings under review and 
a party is likely to be prejudiced as a consequence, the commissioner’s decision is 
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liable to be set aside regardless of the result of the proceedings or whether on the basis 
of the record of the proceedings, that result is nonetheless capable of justification.”230 
According to Van Niekerk J, section 145 of the LRA requires the outcome of CCMA 
arbitration proceedings to fall within a band of reasonableness.231 He went on to hold that, 
this does not stop the court from scrutinising the process in terms of which the decision was 
made.232 In the case of Southern Sun, the court held that if a commissioner fails to take 
material evidence or evidence that is relevant into account, or commits some other 
misconduct or a gross irregularity during the proceedings under review, a party is likely to be 
prejudiced.233 Thus the commissioner’s decision is likely to be set aside notwithstanding the 
result of the proceedings. 234  
The LAC in Herholdt went on to hold that an award would be reviewable if it suffered from 
dialectical unreasonableness or was substantively unreasonable in its outcome.235 According 
to the LAC, substantive unreasonableness means that the decision that the commissioner 
reached was one that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach,236 whereas process-related 
or dialectical unreasonableness means that one is not obliged to consider all the necessary 
facts and issues in order for a decision to be termed a reasonable decision.237  
Furthermore, if a decision-maker does not take relevant information which he/she is bound to 
consider into account, the resulting decision will not be reasonable in the dialectical sense.238 
The court also held that as per the Sidumo test, an applicant must not only establish that the 
commissioner’s reasons are unreasonable, but also that no good reason exists in all the 
material presented before the commissioner to justify the award. 239 The LAC went on to find 
that 'dialectical and substantive unreasonableness are intrinsically interlinked and that latent 
process irregularities carry the inherent risk of causing an unreasonable substantive 
                                               
230 Ibid para 17 
231 Ibid para 37 
232 Ibid para 37 
233 Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others  supra  
234 Ibid 
235 Herholdt  v Nedbank Ltd  (2012) 23 ILJ 1789 LAC. 
236 Ibid para 39 
237 Ibid para 39 
238 Ibid para 39 





outcome.240  For all of these reasons, the LAC concluded that the legal approach adopted by 
the LC was correct and consistent with the prevailing law.241  
Turning to the findings made by the commissioner in her award, the LAC found that they 
were not sustainable because she failed to apply her mind properly to the facts and the 
relevant issue, as well as the law of evidence. 242 With reference to these and other similar 
findings by the commissioner, the LAC concluded that the degree and extent of latent 
irregularities in the award clearly indicated that there was no fair trial of the issues.243  It was 
submitted that the commissioner not only ignored material evidence in relation to the 
deliberate conduct of the appellant but fundamentally misconstrued the respondent’s conflict 
of interest policy with the consequence that her method in determining the issues was latently 
irregular and, in the final analysis, led to a result that was not only incorrect but substantively 
unreasonable.244 
To summarise, the LAC held that the LC had not erred in finding that the commissioner had 
ignored or discounted relevant evidence and failed to apply her mind to a number of material 
issues and, as a consequence, committed gross irregularities in the conduct of the 
proceedings.245 The appeal was accordingly dismissed.246 
It is submitted that the effect of this judgement is that it gave the impression that appeals 
might be preferred in labour matters instead of reviews although this was stated in obiter. 
This led to the proposal that the time has come for the court and the legislature to think again. 
Justice might be better served for all concerned were relief against awards to take the form of 
an appeal rather than a review. 
In my view, this is the correct approach and it is proposed that reviews are replaced by 
appeals in order for justice to be served in labour matters. 
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5.4 The Legal Position in Summary 
The overall legal position emerging from Gaga, Afrox Healthcare and Herholdt can be 
summarized as follows: 
(a)   CCMA awards can be reviewed on the grounds listed in s145 of the LRA and also on the 
grounds of unreasonableness.  
b)   There are two broad types of reviews – result-based reviews (that examine the result) and 
process-related reviews (which examine the process followed by a commissioner in arriving 
at the result). 
(c)   There are also two types of unreasonableness - substantive unreasonableness (aimed at 
the result) and dialectical unreasonableness (aimed at the process). 
(d)   The test for substantive unreasonableness is the Sidumo test, which must be applied as 
per Fidelity Cash Management Service. To succeed, an applicant must establish that, based 
on all the material served before the commissioner, the result of the award is unreasonable 
(i.e., it falls outside the range of reasonable outcomes). Based on this test, the award may be 
wrong, but nevertheless not unreasonable. However, as held in Herholdt, wrong decisions are 
rarely reasonable. 
(e)   Where a commissioner fails to apply his/her mind to materially relevant facts or 
considerations, this constitutes dialectical unreasonableness as consideration of all materially 
relevant facts is fundamental to a reasonable decision. 
(f)   Dialectical and substantive unreasonableness are linked in that a dialectical failure on the 
part of a commissioner will often lead to a substantively unreasonable result (this occurred in 
Gaga, Afrox Healthcare and Herholdt). 
g)   Where a commissioner fails to apply his/her mind to materially relevant facts or 
considerations, this also constitutes a (latent) gross irregularity in terms of s145 of the LRA 
as such a failure results in the losing party being deprived of a fair hearing. 
(h)   A gross irregularity of this nature equates to an act of dialectical unreasonableness. 
(i)   The threshold for interference on review in the case of a gross irregularity/dialectical 
unreasonableness is the potential for prejudice. This can be tested by asking: if the 
commissioner had applied his/her mind to the facts/considerations which he/she ignored, may 
(not would) he/she have come to a different conclusion on the merits? If the answer is in the 





The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) intervened and was admitted as 
amicus curiae by order of the court.  Cosatu expressed the view that the labour courts had 
unreasonably relaxed the grounds for challenging CCMA awards247;  
This surfaced when it was indicated that the grounds for review of gross irregularity in 
respect of CCMA arbitrations under s145(2) (a) (ii) of the LRA involve the consideration of 
what the LAC termed ‘latent irregularities’ and ‘dialectical unreasonableness’; these provide 
a basis for more extensive review than the level of unreasonableness identified as grounds for 
review in Sidumo.248 
According to the SCA, Cosatu’s view appeared to be supported by a recent article concerning 
the effects of three recent LAC judgments, including the one in the present case, which posed 
the question as to whether the test for review of CCMA awards enunciated in Sidumo is in 
decline.249 The court held that ‘there are thus clearly special circumstances that require us to 
entertain the appeal’.250   
The court found it unnecessary to go into the detail of the history of reviews of CCMA 
arbitration awards under the LRA. It held that those responsible for drafting the LRA 
purposefully chose arbitration on a roughly informal basis as the preferred process to deal 
with many issues that arise in the context of labour relations and under the LRA.  This was 
also to be the means for resolving disputes over dismissals, which constitute the bulk of the 
CCMA’s work.251 The court went on to hold that the drafters of the LRA were deliberate in 
rejecting the possibility of appeals and selecting the narrowest possible grounds for review as 
the basis to challenge arbitration awards.252 Their reason for doing so is not because review is 
an inexpensive or speedy way of reconsidering an arbitrator’s award, but because it sets a 
high standard for setting aside an award and, together with the cost and delays inherent in 
reviews, it was thought that this would deter parties from challenging arbitration awards and 
thereby support the overall aim of speedy and inexpensive resolution of such disputes. 253  
The court held further that the height of the bar set by the provisions of s145(2)(a) of the 
LRA254 is apparent in considering the approach to reviews of arbitral awards under the 
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corresponding provisions255 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.256 It also held that the general 
principle is that a ‘gross irregularity’ concerns the conduct of the proceedings and not the 
merits of the decision.257 A ‘gross irregularity’ is evident where decision-makers fail to take 
into account the whole nature of the enquiry and as a result misconceive their mandate or 
their duties in conducting such enquiry.258 
Hence, where the arbitrator’s mandate is conferred by statute then, subject to any limitations 
imposed by the statute, they exercise exclusive jurisdiction over questions of fact and law. 259 
The SCA held that it is clear in case of Sidumo that the distinction between review and 
appeal, which the CC stressed, must be preserved.260. The court further held that, although the 
evidence needs to be scrutinised to determine whether the outcome was reasonable, the 
reviewing court must always remind itself that it should avoid judicial overzealousness in 
setting aside administrative decisions that do not coincide with the judge's own opinions.261   
The LAC reiterated that the test is a stringent one that will ensure that awards are not lightly 
interfered with and stressed that the emphasis is on the result of the case rather than the 
reasons for arriving at that result.262 Furthermore, according to the court,263 Sidumo will 
justify setting aside an award on review if the decision is entirely disconnected with the 
evidence264 or is not supported by any evidence and involves speculation on the part of the 
commissioner.265  
The court went on to hold that after the Sidumo judgement, the position with regard to 
reviews of CCMA arbitration awards should have been clear.  Reviews could be brought on 
the grounds of the unreasonableness test set down by the CC and the particular grounds set 
out in s 145(2) (a) and (b) of the LRA. It is submitted that the latter is not disregarded by the 
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CC266 but should be ‘suffused’ with the constitutional standard of reasonableness. This 
confirms that a ‘gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings’ as envisaged 
by s 145(2) (a) (ii) of the LRA is not confined to a situation where the arbitrator 
misconceives the nature of the enquiry, but extends to those instances where the result was 
unreasonable in the sense explained in a given case.267  
It is submitted that two points flow from this approach. The first is that the threshold for 
interference in the award is lower than in terms of the judgment in Sidumo.268 The second is 
that it is immaterial whether or not the result reached by the arbitrator is one that could 
reasonably be reached on the material before the arbitrator.269 It is submitted that according to 
the court, the mere possibility of prejudice is sufficient to call for intervention. 
In the case of Sidumo, Ngcobo J submitted that, commissioners need to apply their mind to 
the issues that are material to the determination of the dispute in order for justice to prevail.270 
In particular, in conducting arbitration, a commissioner has a duty to determine the material 
facts and then apply the provisions of the LRA to those facts in answering the question of 
whether or not dismissal was fair. According to Ngcobo J, where a commissioner fails to 
apply his or her mind to a matter which is material to the determination of the fairness of the 
sanction, it cannot be said that there was a fair trial of issues. In Herholdt the SCA did not 
agree with Ngcobo J’s submissions. 
Furthermore, the SCA went on to hold that Ngcobo J did not explain how material an 
oversight with regard to the facts would have to be to result in the award being set aside. He 
also did not seek to reconcile this approach with the long chain of authority, which he cited 
and relied on, that held that an error of fact or law by the arbitrator would not justify the 
setting aside of the award, unless the result was that the arbitrator was diverted from the 
correct path in the conduct of the arbitration and thus failed to address the question raised for 
determination in the arbitration.271 This did not relate to the outcome of the arbitration but to 
the conduct of the arbitration. 
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Ngcobo J analysed the arbitrator’s award and held that, it could be construed in a way that did 
not involve the arbitrator making a material error with regard to the facts.272 In contrast the 
majority held that the arbitrator had erred in certain respects in making his award, particularly 
in holding that the relationship of trust between the employer and employee had not been 
breached, but added that it was nonetheless an award that a reasonable decision-maker could 
make in the light of all the facts. In other words, the approach of the majority was clearly 
inconsistent with the approach suggested by Ngcobo J.273. 
The court went on to hold that it is, but only in the limited sense mentioned earlier, where the 
decision-maker has undertaken the wrong enquiry or conducted it in the wrong manner.274 
That is well illustrated by the facts of that case.275 A magistrate charged with a valuation 
appeal was required under the relevant legislation to conduct a fresh enquiry into the question 
of the proper value of the property.276  
He refused to consider the evidence of value tendered by the appellant and stated that he 
could only amend the valuation if it was clearly erroneous.277 In the circumstances he did not 
conduct the correct enquiry and his decision was set aside.278    
The SCA then explained ‘dialectical unreasonableness’ and held that this refers to the 
unreasonableness flowing from an arbitrator’s process of reasoning.279 The question 
confronting a reviewing court, as expressed by the LAC in this case, is whether the decision 
‘is supported by arguments and considerations recognised as valid, even if not conclusive’.280 
The court went on to hold that thorough consideration of all the important and material facts 
and issues is indispensable to a reasonable decision and that if a decision-maker fails to take 
account of a relevant factor which he or she is bound to consider, the resulting decision will 
not be reasonable in a dialectical sense.281 
This approach is also based on a dictum by Ngcobo J, this time in New Clicks282 that reads: 
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‘There is obviously an overlap between the ground of review based on failure to take 
into consideration a relevant factor and one based on the unreasonableness of the 
decision. A consideration of the factors that a decision-maker is bound to take into 
account is essential to a reasonable decision. If a decision maker fails to take into 
account a factor that he or she is bound to take into consideration, the resulting decision 
can hardly be said to be that of a reasonable decision maker.’283 
The first thing to note about this dictum is that it expressly relates to the provisions of the 
PAJA and the manner in which they are to be applied.284 The PAJA does not apply to reviews 
under s 145(2) of the LRA and is therefore not applicable to CCMA awards. Secondly, if 
applied by considering the reasoning of a CCMA arbitrator and determining that the reasons 
given for making an award are not such as to justify that award, its effect is to resuscitate the 
court’s decision in Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration,  even though that decision was expressly overruled 
in Sidumo. Once again, this is not permissible in terms of the law. 
Finally, the court held that, in summary, the position regarding the review of CCMA awards 
is that a review is permissible if the defect in the proceedings falls within one of the grounds 
in s 145(2)(a) of the LRA.  
For a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to amount to a gross irregularity as 
contemplated by s 145(2) (a) (ii), the arbitrator must have misconceived the nature of the 
inquiry or arrived at an unreasonable result. A result will only be unreasonable if it is one that 
a reasonable arbitrator could not reach based on all the material before the arbitrator.285 
Material errors of fact, as well as the weight and relevance attached to particular facts, are not 
in and of themselves sufficient for an award to be set aside, but are only of any consequence 
if their effect is to render the outcome unreasonable.286 
The court then returned to the Herholdt case and held that the issue in dispute was whether 
Herholdt had dishonestly failed to disclose a conflict of interest regarding the two wills.287 It 
is submitted that the commissioner correctly stated in her award that this was the issue. She 
dealt exhaustively with the evidence and concluded that he had not been dishonest. However, 
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the SCA did not agree and held that, given the depth of her treatment of the evidence, it could 
hardly be said that she misconceived the nature of the enquiry.288  
It is submitted that it is clear from the judgments of both the LC and the LAC that the 
commissioner’s conclusion was not one that a reasonable decision-maker could have reached 
in light of the evidence and the issues she was called upon to decide. 
 The result was substantively unreasonable as a commissioner that acted reasonably, would 
not have reached this decision based on the evidence and the inferences that were drawn from 
it.289 The court went on to hold that notwithstanding its excursus on ‘latent irregularities’ and 
‘dialectical unreasonableness’ the LAC was alive to Sidumo and applied it correctly.290 There 
was thus no basis for the SCA to interfere with its decision.291 The appeal was dismissed with 
costs, including legal costs.292 
An analysis of Goldfields Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA 
follows.293 
This once again gave the LAC an opportunity to analyse the approach courts are required to 
follow in reviewing CCMA awards and rulings.  The facts of this case are stated below. 
Moreki was employed by Goldfields mine as a senior sampler.294 He held the highest 
qualification in this field, an Advanced Mine Valuation Certificate.295  
His job involved taking ore samples from measured and plotted rock faces from the mine’s 
underground operations according to the Stope and Development Sampling Standard. 
Moreki was required to take measurements underground so as to indicate the exact location 
of the stope face position from which he extracted ore samples.296 According to the sampling 
standard, measurements must be taken from at least two numbered survey pegs and entered 
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into a field book which is then co-signed by a miner.297 The field book is given to a senior 
dedicated sampler who plots the measurements onto a sampling plan.298 
The ore samples collected by the sampler are sent to a laboratory for analysis in order to 
determine the valuation of the whole area. Hence the decision to mine a particular area 
depends on the results of the laboratory test.299 Mining carries significant costs.300  Therefore 
it is important that the measurements are done according to the sampling standard.301 A 
wrong measurement could result in the mine suffering huge a huge loss.302 The sampler plays 
an extremely important role in selecting areas to mine.303 
According to the facts of this case, on 20 June 2009, the employee in question recorded the 
measurements of an area from which he had collected ore samples in his field book.304 
However, doubt was cast on these measurements and the entry was not co-signed by a 
miner.305 
After a scheduled monthly measurement of various panels which included the panels the 
employee had measured, the surveyors found a discrepancy306. Moreki was confronted 
regarding the discrepancy in the measurements.307 He did not agree that his measurements 
were incorrect and suggested that that someone be sent underground to re-measure the 
panels.308  
The sampler who did so reported that the position of the stope face reported on by the 
employee was 11 metres further than was actually the case.309 This affected the valuation of 
the panels and resulted in a financial loss of R1.2 million.310  
Moreki was charged with serious neglect of duty and failure to work according to the 
applicable standards.311 He was dismissed after being found guilty as charged at the 
disciplinary hearing.312  
                                               
297  Ibid para 3 
298  Ibid para 3 
299  Ibid para 4 
300  Ibid  
301  Ibid  
302  Ibid para 4 
303  Ibid para 4 
304  Ibid para 4 
305  Ibid para 4 
306  Ibid  para 5 
307  Ibid 
308  Ibid   para 6 
309  Ibid 





The employee registered a dispute of unfair dismissal with the CCMA for conciliation and 
thereafter arbitration.313 While he was found guilty of poor work performance, the arbitrator 
found that the sanction of dismissal was too harsh on the basis that his conduct could be 
corrected and improved. He was reinstated by the arbitrator without back pay.314 
The major question that arose in this case is to what extent the LC should be able to overturn 
CCMA awards and rulings315. It is clear that the intention of the legislature was that the 
powers of the court in this regard should be limited.316 The LRA, 66 of 1995 does not make 
provision for an appeal against arbitration awards or rulings.317 It merely allows for the 
review of such awards on limited grounds (e.g., where the arbitrator commits misconduct in 
relation to his/her duties or there is a gross irregularity in the arbitration).  However, 
experience over the past few years has shown that the concept of a review has been widely or 
narrowly interpreted by different courts; this has sparked widespread debate.318  
It is submitted that this was a far wider interpretation than the traditional approach to the 
concept of gross irregularity, which was largely limited to a situation where the arbitrator 
misconceives the whole nature of the enquiry, and as a result misconceives his/her mandate 
or duties in conducting the enquiry.319 
However, the SCA did not uphold the LAC’s generous approach to the Herholdt 
judgement.320 It revisited and analysed the provisions of s145 of the LRA, and stated that the 
legislature was deliberate in rejecting the option of an appeal of awards.321 It is submitted that 
the court deliberately chose review, on narrow grounds, to deter parties from seeking to 
challenge awards. This supported the purpose of the CCMA as a dispute resolution forum 
that offers an inexpensive and expeditious resolution process.322 The SCA summarised the 
position as follows:323 
  ‘A review …is permissible if the defect in the proceedings falls within one of the 
grounds in s145 (2) (a) of the LRA. For a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to 
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amount to a gross irregularity as contemplated by s 145(2) (a) (ii) …the arbitrator 
must have misconceived the nature of the inquiry or arrived at an unreasonable result. 
A result will only be unreasonable if it is one that a reasonable arbitrator could not 
reach on all the material that was before the arbitrator. Material errors of fact, are not 
in and of themselves sufficient for an award to be set aside, but are only of any 
consequence if their effect is to render the outcome unreasonable.’ 324 
Since the coming into force of the Constitutional Seventeenth Amendment Act, 2012 the 
SCA no longer has the jurisdiction to hear appeals from the LAC and the latter is now the 
final body of appeal (except for constitutional issues) in interpreting the LRA. 325 
It was therefore with much anticipation that observers waited to see if the LAC would follow 
the SCA decision in Herholdt when it next confronted the review test issue. The Goldfields 
decision was the LAC’s first consideration of the test for review after the SCA’s Herholdt 
decision. 
It is submitted that in its judgment, the LAC recognized that the process-related grounds for 
review provided for in s145(2)(a) still pertain but that once the procedural defect is 
established, the reviewing court must go a step further and satisfy itself that the defect 
resulted in the award being one that a reasonable arbitrator could not have reached.  
According to the LAC, 326 
What is required is first to consider the gross irregularity that the arbitrator is said to 
have committed and then to apply the reasonableness test established by Sidumo. The 
gross irregularity is not a self-standing ground insulated or independent of the Sidumo 
test. That being the case it serves no purpose for the reviewing court to consider and 
analyse every issue raised at the arbitration and regard failure by the arbitrator to 
consider all or some of the issues albeit material as rendering the award liable to be set 
aside on the grounds of process-related review.’327 
It is submitted that in Goldfields the LAC reaffirmed the purpose of an arbitrator, as set out in 
s138 of the LRA, as being to address the substantial merits of a dispute between parties with 
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minimal legal formalities and to do so expeditiously and fairly.  According to the LAC, the 
relevant enquiries to make in review applications are the following:328 
‘(i) In terms of his or her duty to deal with the matter with the minimum of legal 
formalities, did the process that the arbitrator employed give the parties a full 
opportunity to have their say in respect of the dispute? (ii) Did the arbitrator identify 
the dispute he was required to arbitrate…? (iii) Did the arbitrator understand the 
nature of the dispute he or she was required to arbitrate? (iv) Did he or she deal with 
the substantial merits of the dispute? And (v) Is the arbitrator’s decision one that 
another decision-maker could reasonably have arrived at based on the evidence?’329 
In the Goldfields matter, Moreki had been dismissed for allegations of misconduct.330 
However, the arbitrator found that he was in fact guilty of poor performance and that the 
sanction of dismissal was too harsh. He ordered that Moreki be reinstated. 331 
Applying the review test that it had articulated, the LAC came to the conclusion that the 
arbitrator had misconceived the nature of the enquiry, which had been to determine whether 
Moreki’s dismissal, based on misconduct, was fair.332 Thus the arbitrator had erroneously 
miscategorised Moreki’s conduct as poor performance, which required a different enquiry 
from that of cases involving misconduct.333 This amounted to a gross irregularity. 
The LAC stated that 334 
‘…the arbitrator committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings. The 
conclusion he arrived at was influenced by the wrong categorisation of the case against 
the Third Respondent. This however is not sufficient for the award to be reviewed and 
set aside. The question needs to be asked: had the categorisation of the case against the 
Third Respondent been misconduct as opposed to poor performance, is the arbitrator’s 
award nonetheless one that could be arrived at by a reasonable decision-maker? In my 
view it is clearly not. The Third Respondent committed a serious act of misconduct…the 
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decision arrived at by the arbitrator is not one which a reasonable-maker could 
reach’.335 
This means that, where an arbitrator commits misconduct in relation to his/her duties or there 
is a gross process-related irregularity in the arbitration, this is not - in and of itself - sufficient 
grounds to warrant interference by our courts on review. In addition, the irregularity must be 
of such a nature that it renders the decision reached unreasonable in the circumstances.336 
In other words, it is no longer good enough for employers or employees wishing to review an 
award based on one of the procedural defects provided for in s 145(2)(a), to only establish the 
existence of the defect, i.e., misconduct by an arbitrator in relation to his/her duties, a gross 
irregularity committed by the arbitrator in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings or the 
arbitrator exceeding his/her powers. 
It is submitted that it may become be more difficult to successfully prosecute review 
applications in the LC. In my view this case shows that the Sidumo test is still the locus 
classicus when it comes to reviews. This is because the test was set out clearly by the CC in 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that Herholdt breaks new ground in that it is the first time that the LAC has 
expressly held that the test for prejudice in the case of a gross irregularity is no more than the 
potential that the commissioner may have come to a different conclusion if he/she had 
applied his mind to the facts/considerations which he/she ignored. This is clearly a much 
lower threshold for interference than the Sidumo test. 
Murphy adds that there may be another twist in the tale337. Although having previously found 
that a misapplication of the Sidumo test does not alone constitute a basis for leave to appeal to 
the SCA,338  in the Herholdt judgement, it affirmed that the Sidumo test is the correct one and 
that it should be followed by the courts. This confirms that the Sidumo test is not in decline. 
Experienced and highly regarded labour lawyer and arbitrator, John Brand has questioned 
whether the absence of a right to appeal is appropriate in compulsory arbitration 
proceedings,339 when parties are compelled into a process and have an adjudicator forced 
upon them.340 While he notes that it is acceptable for parties to not have the right to appeal 
when they  opt out of formal litigation and choose private arbitration, the situation changes 
when one party forces another party to take part in arbitration and an adjudicator is imposed 
on them. In the latter situation, fairness and legitimacy require that the parties should be able 
to challenge an adverse finding341 
Brand adds that dismissal jurisprudence is more complex than many realize, often with grave 
implications for workers in a context of high unemployment and inadequate social 
security.342 He therefore argues that, under current circumstances in South Africa, it is 
inappropriate to treat an unfair dismissal case as a simple, small claim with no right of 
appeal.343 Brand further submits that appeals provide greater consistency and may improve 
the quality of both the process and outcomes.344 
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Few support limiting judicial supervision to review on the narrow grounds in s 145(2) of the 
LRA.345 In certain cases, the LC has relied on s 158(1)(g) of the LRA to extend the scope of 
review to allow for review on the grounds of reasonableness and rationality.346 This provision 
forms part of the section governing the powers of the LC. In its original formulation it 
provided that: 
'The Labour Court may - despite section 145, review the performance or purported 
performance of any function provided for in this Act or any act or omission of any person or 
body in terms of this Act on any grounds that are permissible in law.'347 
The use of the word “despite” supports the interpretation that a wider basis for review of 
arbitration awards (on any permissible legal grounds) was contemplated and reinforces the 
contention that the provision was necessary to give full effect to the constitutional right to 
administrative action that is lawful, fair and justifiable, which s 145 apparently failed to do.348 
It is submitted that the LAC gave important guidance on what it intended to achieve by 
extending the scope of review.349 Furthermore, it emphasized that it would be wrong to read 
into s145 of the LRA an abolition of the distinction between review and appeal.350 The LRA 
does not maintain a clear division and the concept of justifiability nor should rationality lead 
to the distinction being abandoned.351 It is conceded, however, that in determining whether 
arbitration proceedings and awards are justifiable or rational, value judgments will be made 
which, almost inevitably, will involve the consideration of the merits in one way or 
another.352  
The court in the Carephone supra held the following: 
'As long as the judge determining this issue is aware that he or she enters the merits not in 
order to substitute his or her own opinion on the correctness thereof, but to determine whether 
the outcome is rationally justifiable, the process will be in order.'353  
It is submitted that ‘Carephone was a welcome and prudent intervention’354 as it introduced 
an appropriate and adequate level of judicial supervision which accorded with prevailing 
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constitutional norms and the public's sense of justice.355 Nevertheless it contained the seeds 
of destruction of the legislature’s desire for a more informal and less legalistic process.356 
Review on the grounds of rationality requires analysis of the link between the reasons for a 
decision and the evidence upon which it is based.357 This meant that the CCMA was obliged 
to become a tribunal of record, perhaps contributing to further juridification of the process 
and an increasingly technical, formal and legalistic practice’.358 
It is submitted that, as the judgment in Carephone suggests, the notion that justifiability of 
the award on the merits of the material placed before the arbitrator can properly fall within 
the ambit of an excess of the arbitrator's powers, is certainly new. To adopt such an approach 
is to effectively state that the only jurisdiction that arbitrators have is to decide the case 
correctly; this is not only contrary to the authority granted them, but would have the effect of 
transforming a review into an appeal.' 359 
Murphy contends that, ‘it is hard to disagree with Judge Wallis that the approach in 
Carephone went against authority, but his point that rationality review would transform 
reviews into appeals is submitted to be  something of an overstatement’.360 After Carephone, 
the line between the two was more likely to be blurred.361 A rationality review will often 
mutate into an appeal on the merits and there is no legal basis for introducing such a 
review362  
It is submitted that there is no getting away from the fact that rationality and reasonableness 
reviews can resemble appeals, depending on the factual and legal issues that are subject to 
challenge’. The most identifiable outcome is that bad decisions are sometimes allowed to 
stand because they are rational. 
It is further submitted that parties that have the financial means, a grievance and a creative 
legal representative will not encounter many difficulties in crafting a rationality review from 
a bad or incorrect arbitration award.  It seems that parties use review to achieve much the 
same end as an appeal and LC judges have been known to use their review powers to perform 
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an appeal function to correct mistakes by CCMA commissioners.363 It is submitted that the 
LAC's caution to judges in Carephone not to enter the merits for the wrong reason has not 
always been heeded, confirming Wallis AJ’s prognosis that a rationality review would at 
times have the effect of transforming reviews into appeals.364 
Murphy submits that from a moral and constitutional perspective, parties probably prefer an 
appeal because they want to be treated lawfully, correctly and with due regard to the merits of 
their cause.365 The author asks: ‘why should those interests yield to the expedience of a 
supposedly quick and informal process, which practice shows will often be neither, especially 
when the arbitrator gets it wrong?’366  
However, the SCA has taken a bold stance on the difference between appeals and reviews in 
a judgement recently handed down in Herholdt v Nedbank. The SCA restated that the test set 
in the case of Sidumo by the CC is the locus classicus and should be followed by the courts 
when it comes to review. 
‘Far better,’ Murphy submits, ‘would be a system that provided for an arbitration followed by 
a single appeal on the record on whether the arbitrator got the decision on fairness right or 
wrong’.367 Aside from the dilemmas raised by the overlapping and contradictory standards of 
review, for Murphy, there is an even better reason to revert to an appeal.368 However 
Murphy’s submission was rejected by the SCA in the recent case of Herholdt supra. 
‘In the circumstances, the submission by some that it may be more appropriate to allow 
parties a clearly defined right to appeal is a good one’.369 It is further submitted that in the 
context of unfair dismissal, there is little real worth left in the rationale that review is better in 
circumscribing the ambit of administrative decision-making and ensuring that the courts do 
not usurp the functions of administrative tribunals.370 Accordingly it is submitted that the 
labour courts themselves are specialists and are well-placed to assess the correctness of 
fairness decisions.371 Therefore, it is increasingly recognized that justice in labour relations 
will be better promoted by enabling judicial supervision through an appeal. 
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However, the SCA’s assertion in the Herholdt case that the ‘distinction between review and 
appeal, which the Constitutional Court stressed is to be preserved’,372 is clearer in the case of 
the Sidumo test. The court further held that ‘while the evidence must necessarily be 
scrutinised to determine whether the outcome was reasonable, the reviewing court must 
always be alert to remind itself that it must avoid 'judicial overzealousness in setting aside 
administrative decisions that do not coincide with the judge's own opinions'.’373 The LAC 
subsequently stressed that the test ‘is a stringent [one] that will ensure that … awards are not 
lightly interfered with’374 and that its emphasis is on the result of the case rather than the 
reasons for arriving at that result.375 The Sidumo test will, however, justify setting aside an 
award on review if the decision is ‘entirely disconnected with the evidence’376 or is 
‘unsupported by any evidence’377 and involves speculation by the commissioner.  
It is submitted that the court has reaffirmed that the Sidumo test is not in decline and is the 
proper test to follow when it comes to reviews. This clearly indicates that the courts are not of 
the view that appeals are better than reviews. They still favour reviews and in particular, the 
Sidumo test is the locus classicus and should be followed. 
I agree with the submission that the Sidumo is the correct test as this leads to fair outcomes in 
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